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The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among nouns and is generally 
taken to have semantic content, that is, to reflect a semantic mass-count distinction. There are 
two main approaches as to what such a semantic mass-count distinction consists in:  
[1] the extension-based approach, according to which the semantic mass-count distinction 
consists in mereological properties of the extension of nouns, an approach that goes back to 
Quine (1960) and has been developed particularly by Link (1986) and others following him. 
[2] the object-based approach, according to which the semantic mass-count distinction 
consists in mereological properties of the entities (or entities-in-contexts/situations) in those 
extensions, an approach that goes back at least as far as Aristotle and more recently Jespersen 
(1924). 
The notion of an atom is central for the first view, on which atoms make up the extension of 
singular count nouns, but not mass nouns. The notion of integrity is central for the second 
view: entities that have a boundary, form or other sort of integrity make up the extension of 
singular count nouns, but not mass nouns. Theories of the semantic mass-count distinction of 
either sort generally face three sorts of major challenges:  
[1] from classifier languages such as Chinese, which lack a syntactic mass-count distinction 
among nouns and in which all nouns are, it seems, treated as ‘mass’ or ‘number-neutral’, 
regardless of their extensions or the entities they describe,   
[2] from ‘object mass nouns’, a rather large class of nouns in English (and other languages)  
such as furniture, luggage, personnel, hardware, and police force, to which standard semantic 
characterizations of mass nouns do not apply, and   
[3] from the relative arbitrariness of the choice of mass or count categories of nouns across 
languages as well as within the same language, with mass and count nouns often competing 
for the same items (chothes - clothing, shoes, footwear, hair – ital. capelli (plural) dishes – 
German Geschirr (mass)). 
     Yet the syntactic mass-count distinction clearly appears to go along with a semantic mass-
count distinction. A novel view that has emerged more recently emerged in face of those 
challenges is what I call the grammar-based approach, the approach according to which the 
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content of the mass-count distinction is to be understood at a level of ‘grammaticized 
individuation’ (Rothstein 2010, 2017) or language-driven ontology (Moltmann, to appear). 
This, roughly, means that the use of a count noun (but not a mass noun) conveys a notion of 
unity (and hence countability) which need not align with the individuation of entities at the 
level of cognition or the real structure of things.  Object mass nouns fail to convey unity in 
that sense, even though their lexical content appears to describe well-individuated entities at 
the level of cognitive ontology or reality. Nouns in languages such as Chinese likewise fail to 
convey unity in that sense and generally require the use of a numeral classifier for the purpose 
of counting. The language-driven notion of unity is often based on natural unity at the level of 
cognition, but it need not be.   
    There are different ways of conceiving of such language-imposed unity: 
[1] as a feature conveyed by a silent or explicit classifier (Borer 2005) 
[2] as the property of being an atom relative to a context (Rothstein 2010, 2017) 
[3] as the property of being a unified whole in a situation or under a perspective 
[4] as a primitive property that some entities have and others lack, without that amounting to a 
substantial ontological difference. In this paper, I will make use of option [4], but not too 
much hinges of that choice for the particular aims of this paper.  
      The mass-count distinction raises the general question how syntactic categories that lack a 
morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction fare with respect to a semantic mass-count 
distinction. The grammar-based approach makes a clear prediction: syntactic categories not 
exhibiting a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction should not display a semantic mass-
count distinction, since countability is tied to the use of a count category. This paper presents 
particular evidence that that prediction is borne out, namely from the mass-count 
classification of verbs with respect to their Davidsonian (1967) event argument position. 
      In natural language semantics, at least since Bach (1986), it has been taken for granted 
that verbs, VPs, or sentences as predicates of events or what I will call the verbal domain of 
events display the same sort of semantic mass-count distinction as nouns, with achievement 
and accomplishments (or telic VPs or sentences) classifying semantically as count and 
activities and states (or atelic VPs or sentences) as mass. The parallelisms are generally 
observed from the point of view of approaches [1] or [2] to the mass-count distinction and 
thus are cast in terms of properties of extensions or of entities. The parallelisms between the 
nominal domain and the verbal domain of events have served to account for a range of 
semantic phenomena, such as the applicability of for- and in-adverbials, and the way 
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adverbials such as frequently or more count or measure. In addition, they appear to receive 
support by recent research in cognitive science (Wellwood / Hespos / Rips 2018). 
     However, the existence and explanatory role of such parallelisms does not mean that the 
verbal domain of events displays the actual content of the mass-count distinction. The paper 
will argue that it in fact fails to display the mass-count distinction given criteria for mass and 
count that are applicable to verbs: verbs with respect to their event argument position display 
the diagnostics of mass rather than count, regardless of their Aktionsart and the event-
process/state distinction. The mass-count criteria applicable to verbs include the applicability 
of cardinal and ordinal numerals and count quantifiers without event classifier (time(s)) and, 
in German, the support of plural or mass anaphora, the choice of count or mass relative 
pronouns, and the applicability of the duality introducing mass quantifier beides.  The 
classification of verbs as mass (with respect to their event argument position) is predicted by 
the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction, and the mass diagnostics 
displayed by verbs can be accounted in terms of semantic selection within that approach, in 
just the way such diagnostics have been accounted for within the grammar-based approach for 
nouns (Rothstein 2017). 
       This prediction of the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction generalizes 
to other categories lacking a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction, such as that-clauses 
and numerals in argument position, which exhibit the applicable diagnostics for mass- 
categories. The generalization then is that syntactic categories lacking a (syntactic) mass-
count distinction classify semantically as mass rather than count. This generalization can be 
further extended to non-referential uses of NPs on which semantic properties of extensions 
won’t matter, such as NPs used intensionally, predicatively, or as measure phrases. On such 
uses, NPs semantically classify as mass rather than count, regardless of their syntactic 
category (as mass or count) and regardless of the semantic or ontological properties one may 
attribute to their contents or intensions. Again, the absence of grammaticized individuation or 
language-driven unity can explain the mass diagnostics of such uses of nominal categories. 
    The paper will first present the standard criteria for the mass-count distinction in English as 
well as the two standard approaches to the content of the mass-count distinction with their 
application to the verbal domain of events. It then discusses the diagnostics for the mass status 
of verbs and gives an account of them in terms of the grammar-based approach. Finally, it 
extends the view to categories lacking a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction. 
 
1. Views of the mass-count distinction 
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1.1. Criteria for the mass-count distinction  
 
The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among nouns, and there a range 
of diagnostics for it. Not all languages share the same diagnostics, and there is always the 
question whether particular diagnostics are just a reflection of the morpho-syntactic 
distinction or whether they can be explained semantically, in terms of the content of the 
syntactic mass-count distinction.
1
  For the present purposes, I will focus on standard 
diagnostics that are generally taken to hold for the mass-count distinction in English and 
related languages. But I will augment them with a few new diagnostics specifically from 
German, which are applicable to verbs.
2
  
     One important syntactic criterion for the mass-count distinction is that count nouns 
generally display a singular-plural distinction, but not mass nouns. Verbs show singular or 
plural agreement with a count NP as subject, but singular agreement with a mass NP as 
subject. Furthermore, count nouns go with quantifiers like many ,  few, and several, mass 
nouns with much and little. Count nouns go with modified number (a large / small  number), 
mass nouns with modified amount (a large / small amount) (Kayne 2010). Count NPs also 
support count-related anaphora such as one and another, but not so mass NPs. Another 
important mass-count criterion is that count nouns allow for the application of cardinal 
numerals (two shoes), but mass nouns do not (* two footwear). Moreover, count nouns allow 
for ordinal numerals such as first, second, and third (the first house), but not mass nouns (?? 
the second wood / furniture).  
    Related to the last two criteria are corresponding semantic selectional constraints on verbs, 
which are not generally noted in the literature.
3
 Count generally applies only to count NPs 
(John counted the piles of wood), not mass NPs (??? John counted the wood). Predicates of 
ranking or listing apply to count NPs (John ranked / listed enumerated  the dresses), but not 
mass NPs (?? John ranked / listed / enumerated the clothing).  
                                                             
1 See Treves and Rothstein (to appear) and Bale / Gillon (to appear). 
 
2 See, for example, Doetjes (2015), Pelletier/Schubert (1989/2013) and Chierchia (1998) for standard criteria for 
the mass-count distinction.  It appears that across languages, there is not a single set of mass-count diagnostics, 
but rather various sorts of sets, and they may determine a gradual distinction, rather than a binary one (Treves 
and Rothstein, to appear). It is therefore important to focus on particular diagnostics and a semantic or syntactic 
account of them. 
 
3 But see Moltmann (1997) for part-structure-sensitive semantic selection that verbs such as count, rank and 
enumerate impose. 
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1.2. Standard approaches to the mass-count distinction 
 
Two types of standard approaches to the semantic content of the mass-count distinction 
among nouns can be distinguished: [1] the extension-based approach and [2] the object-based 
approach. The extension-based approach can be traced to back to Quine (1960), the object-
based approach to Aristotle and, in modern times, Jespersen (1948).  
      On the extension-based approach, the semantic distinction between singular count, plural 
and mass nouns resides in properties of their extensions, generally formulated in terms of 
extensional mereology (Link 1983, Krifka 1989, Chierchia 1998, Champollion/Krifka 2017). 
A common version of the approach is given below, making use of the proper-part relation < 
and the sum formation operator (on sets) ⊕: 
 
(1) Extensional mereological account of the semantic mass-count distinction 
      a. For a singular noun N, [N] is atomic, i.e. ∀x(P(x) →∀y(y < x → ¬ P(y))) 
      b. For a plural noun Nplur , [Nplur] = {x |∃P (P ≠ ∅ & P ⊆ [N] & x = ⊕P} 
      c. For a mass noun N, N is cumulative P (P ≠ ∅ & P ⊆ [N] → ⊕P  [N]) and not atomic. 
 
Sometimes a stronger condition than lack of atomicity is imposed on mass nouns, namely 
divisiveness (a predicate P is divisive iff ∀x(P(x) →∀y(y < x → P(y)))) (Chang 1973). 
      The extension-based approach to the mass-count distinction faces two sorts of well-known 
problems. First, atomicity does not generally hold for singular count nouns, for example not 
for count nouns like entity, twig, fence, sequence or part (Moltmann 1997, 1998, 
Zucchi/White 2001, Rothstein 2010). Moreover, object mass nouns such as police force, 
furniture, personnel, clothing, jewelry, a rather large subcategory of mass nouns in English, 
fail to satisfy standard extensional mereological conditions on mass nouns such as not being 
atomic (Chierchia 1998, Rothstein 2017, Cohen, to appear). The approach likewise does not 
offer an account of pairs like clothes – clothing, rice grains – rice etc., which will have the 
very same extensions, yet display semantic differences (Chrierchia 1998, Rothstein 2017). 
      On the object-based approach, the semantic distinction between singular count, plural and 
mass nouns resides in the sorts of properties nouns attribute to entities or entities in 
contexts/situations. Singular count nouns convey properties that involve a boundary or more 
generally conditions of integrity (Simons 1987) or integrity in a situation of reference carrying 
contextual information (Moltmann 1997, 1998). Entities in the extension of mass nouns lack a 
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boundary or integrity, or integrity in a situation of contextual information. The following is an 
integrity- and situation-based account of the mass-count distinction along the lines of 
Moltmann (1997, 1998): 
 
(2) Integrity-based account of the semantic mass-count distinction 
      a. If N is a singular count noun, then for a situation of reference s, if <x, s>  [N], then 
          x is an integrated whole in s. 
      b. For a plural noun Nplur , [Nplur] = {<x, s> |∃P(P ≠ ∅ &  P x {s}  ⊆ [N] & x = ⊕P)} 
      c. If N is a mass noun, then for a minimal situation of reference s such that <x, s>  [N],  
           then x is not a (strong) integrated whole in s. 
 
The integrity-based account avoids the problems for atomicity for sequence-type nouns. Since 
atomicity is not imposed on count nouns, there is no problem for part of an entity in the 
extension of sequence to be in the extension of sequence again.
4
   
     However, the integrity-based account faces difficulties of its own. First, there are nouns to 
which the notion of integrity is hardly applicable, for example amount, sum, or loose 
collection, or sequence.
5
 Moreover, the integrity-based account faces similar difficulties as the 
extensional mereological account for object mass nouns, whose extensions consists in 
inherent integrated wholes.
6
  
         Let me turn to the grammar-based approach to semantic mass-count distinction.  The 
basic idea of that approach is that the use of a count noun or classifier (and only that) conveys 
a notion of unity (and hence countability), a notion that need not align with the individuation 
of entities at the level of cognition or reality.  On that approach, object mass nouns fail to 
convey unity, even though their lexical content describes well-individuated entities.
7
 Also 
nouns in languages such as Chinese will fail to convey unity on the grammar-based approach. 
                                                             
4 The reason why we generally able to refer to a unique entity with the sequence because situations of reference 
generally contain just entities with the highest degree of integrity, the maximal sequence, a maximal entity 
consisting of connected parts.    
 
5 Such cases could at best be handled by positing a notion of merely conceived, ungrounded integrity (Moltmann 
1997). 
 
6 By modifying the role of situations, the integrity-based account might permit an account of object mass nouns 
by allowing the situations to ‘leave out’ conditions that define entities as integrated whole, as was suggested by 
Cohen (to appear).  
 
7 Object mass nouns and plural mass nouns in fact may not just reflect a semantic difference, as on the grammar-
based approach, but even in cognitive ontology, as has been argued by Wisniewski / Imai / Casey (1996). 
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Conveying unity with such nouns requires the addition of a numeral classifier.
8
 There are 
different versions of the grammar-based approach. I will focus on two versions that have been 
proposed in the literature and propose a third version that I will adopt. 
    Borer’s (2005) theory of the mass-count distinction is in a way is a purely syntactic version 
of the grammar-based approach. On Borer’s syntactic theory, count NPs are distinguished 
from mass NPs by the presence of an implicit classifier ind, which is spelled out by the 
singular determiner a or plural morphology in English and as a numeral classifier in 
languages such as Chinese. On that theory, the restriction of numerals is accounted for 
syntactically, in terms of their requirement of a (silent or overt) classifier. This, however, fails 
to give an account of the inapplicability of count and rank to mass NPs, for which a syntactic 
explanation would be inapplicable.  
    Rothstein’s (2010, 2017) version of the grammar-based approach conceives of the content 
of the mass-count distinction in terms of ‘grammaticized individuation’, as she calls it. A 
count noun N applies to entities n only relative to a context k in which they count as atoms 
with respect to N, where context is a restricted set of entities. Mass nouns, by contrast, apply 
just to entities, which means they do not guarantee that the entities they apply to are atoms. 
The difference between count nouns and mass nouns, most importantly, consists in a type 
difference: mass nouns are of type  <e, t> (properties of entities), whereas count nouns are of 
type <<n, k>, t> (properties of entities in contexts). The difference in type is used to explain 
why numerals and count quantifiers require count nouns: they only select nouns of type <<e, 
k>, t>, but not of type <e, t>. Classifiers semantically map a predicate of type <e, t> onto a 
predicate of type <<e, k>, t>, making numerals applicable.  
     Rothstein’s type-theoretic distinction between mass and count nouns faces several 
difficulties. First, there are context in which an NP is used neutral between mass and count, 
for example the pronouns what in What did John eat? John ate soup and beans. Second, 
Rothstein’s type-theoretical account has difficulties accounting for conjunction of NPs, as in 
John took the wood and the stones.  It is unclear how the wood and the stones could stand for 
a sum of entities that belong to different types. Even more difficult to handle would be the 
wood and the stones in the garden, where the restriction in the garden should apply to both 
conjuncts. Finally, the type-theoretic approach would impose an implausible type ambiguity 
                                                             
8 Bale / Gillon (to appear) show that there are some quantifiers in Chinese that do not require classifiers. This 
would be compatible with the grammar-based approach, which permits countability to be conveyed lexically as 
well (Section. 3.3.). 
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onto all verbs with respect to their subject or object position, since verbs generally take both 
count and mass NPs (with exceptions such as count, rank and list).  
     On the third version of the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction, the 
language-driven notion of unity is by taken to be a feature that some entities at the relevant 
level of ontology have and others don’t.9 Unity itself can be taken to be a primitive notion. 
Unity is usually grounded in conditions of integrity of some sort or atomicity (with respect to 
a relevant concept); but it need not be so grounded.  After all, whether some pieces of wood 
are regarded ‘a pile of wood’ (entity with unity) or just ‘wood’ (entity without unity) or 
‘pieces of wood’ (non-unity) seems entirely a matter of choice or perspective.10  
       The distinction between entities that have unity in the language-driven sense and entities 
that don’t may also be understood in perspectival, and thus less ontological, terms, as the 
distinction between entities that have unity under the relevant perspective or in the relevant 
situation and entities that lack unity under the relevant perspective or in the relevant situation. 
     Elaborating the distinction in one of these ways further is a philosophical task that goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes the two views serve the same purpose: 
what matters is that the domain of entities that provides semantic values for quantifiers and 
referential NPs divides into two distinct subdomains: a subdomain Du of entities that come 
with unity and a subdomain Dn of entities that don’t, regardless of whether the entities in Du 
and Dn are just individuals or perspectival beings (individuals-in-situations). Entities in the 
domain Du allow for a 1-1 mapping onto numbers, for the purpose of counting, listing or 
enumerating, entities in the domain Dn don’t.
11
 The distinction between the two subdomains 
most importantly serves the purpose of allowing mass nouns and count nouns to differ in their 
denotations, but without that amounting to a type difference or a substantial ontological 
difference (that is, an ontological between entities as they ‘really’ are). 
       The distinction between the two types of entities (Du and Dn) allows predicates to 
semantically select one or the other.  The restriction of cardinal and ordinal numerals to count 
NPs, thus, is a matter of semantic selection, just like the restrictions of the corresponding 
                                                             
9 If preferred, one might also take unity to be a feature that acts as a gloss for some entities (‘x qua unity’), but 
not others. 
 
10 See Moltmann (to appear). 
 
11 There is a question whether the difference between beings that have unity (individuals) and beings that don’t 
(quantities) can be captured in terms of standard formal means of set theory, as a distinction between two 
domains of entities. After all, in the metalanguage the entities in both domains are treated as single entities. But 
again this is a philosophical question that needs to be pursued elsewhere. In the present context, a simple 
representation of the intuitive difference must suffice. 
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verbs count, rank, enumerate, and list. That is, a predicate P from this group is subject to the 
following condition: 
 
(3) Semantic selectional requirement for number-related predicates 
      For a number-related predicate P and an entity e, [P](e) = true or false only if  
      e  {d |∃P(P ≠ ∅ & P ⊆ Du & d = ⊕P)} 
 
The distinction between Du and Dn also serves the semantics of classifiers. Similarly to 
Rothstein’s (2017) account, classifiers will denote a function mapping entities in Dn onto 
entities in Du, which is an ontological operation, but not of a substantial ontological sort. 
 
2. Events and the semantic mass-count distinction 
 
There is a long tradition of classifying events or rather event predicates into different types or 
Aktionsarten, distinguishing in particular achievements and accomplishment from activities 
and states (Kenny 1963, Vendler 1957, Mourelatos 1978). A related distinction is that 
between telic and atelic VPs as well as that between non-homogeneous and homogenous VPs 
(Verkuyl 1972, Bach 1986, Krifka 1989).  Run to the house is telic, run and run toward the 
house are atelic; eat an apple and drink the wine are telic, eat apples and drink wine atelic. A 
common criterion for telicity (non-homogeneity) is the applicability of in-adverbials (John ate 
an apple/drank the wine / ran to the house in five minutes, * John ate apples / drank wine / 
ran toward the house in five minutes). A common criterion for atelicity is the applicability of 
for-adverbials (John ate apples / drank wine / walked toward the house for one hour, * John 
at the apple / drank the wine / ran to the house for five minutes).
12
 Telicity (of a VP or 
sentence) depends on the meaning of the verb, properties of temporal modifiers, grammatical 
aspect (progressive, perfective and imperfective), as well as mereological, quantificational and 
referential properties of nominal arguments expressing event participants (Verkuyl 1972, 
1992, Bennett/Parte 1972, Dowty 1979, Krifka 1998). 
      Bach (1986) was the first to explicitly propose that the verbal domain of events divide into 
a mass and a count domain parallel to that of the nominal domain, taking the extension-based 
approach to the mass-count distinction (see also Krifka 1989 and Champollion 2017). Bach 
                                                             
12 The criterion is not uncontroversial, though. See Moltmann (1989) for the view that for-adverbials do not in 
fact select homogenous event predicates, but just act as quantifiers over contextually relevant parts of an interval. 
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associates events not with verbs, though (as Davidsonian arguments), but rather takes sets of 
events to be the denotations of more complex verbal or sentential expressions whose 
composition influences the relevant mereological properties. Those denotations are then 
classified just like that of nouns: as mass in case they are cumulative and divisive 
(homogenous) (John ran, John drank wine), singular count in case they are atomic (John ate 
the apple, John ran to the house) and plural in case they consist of sums of atomic events 
(John jumped, John ate apples).  
   The aim of this paper is not to put into doubts the parallelisms between extensions of count 
and mass nouns and telic and atelic event predicates (or achievements/accomplishments) in 
terms of properties such as atomicity, cumulativity, and homogeneity. It does not question 
their role for explaining the choices of adverbials as well as other semantic phenomena. The 
point rather is that they do not match the proper classification of verbs in terms of the mass-
count distinction: all verbs show diagnostics of mass rather than count, regardless of the 
semantic (extensional-mereological) properties of the event predicates in which they occur. 
     The fact that sentences or VPs rather than just verbs are classified in terms of the 
(semantic) mass-count distinction is a first indication that the traditional view misapplies the 
mass-count distinction. The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among 
nouns with a content distinguishing among noun contents. The classification of VPs or 
sentences according to a semantic mass-count distinction makes the (verbal) domain of events 
not parallel to the nominal domain. As a matter of fact, complex NPs could be classified in the 
same way as VPs or sentences with respect to the semantic mass-count distinction. Applying 
the extension-based approach to the semantic mass-count distinction means that the water in 
the glass would classify as singular count, since it satisfies atomicity (no proper part of the 
entity that is the denotation of the water in the glass is also the denotation of the water in the 
glass (which refers to the maximal quantity of water in glass)). Moreover, the water in the 
glasses might satisfy the criterion for semantic plurality since the denotation of the water in 
the glasses is a fusion of entities that are referents of the water in a glass and as such classify 
as atoms (with respect to that description). However, the mass-count distinction is generally 
not applied to complex NPs that way.
13,
 
14
 The application of the proper diagnostics of the 
mass-count distinction should be to verbs, rather than VPs or sentences.  
                                                             
13 Within the object-based approach, Moltmann (1997) actually argued for a semantic mass-count distinction for 
complex NPs that is independent of the syntactic mass-count distinction,. The water in the glass counts as an 
integrated whole in a situation of reference s (being a maximal quantity satisfy the property ‘water in the glass’ 
in s), the water in the glasses counts as a plurality of integrated wholes in a reference situation. Moltmann (2016) 
criticized that approach to the semantic mass-count distinction: even if ‘the water in the glass’ is an integrated 
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3. Mass diagnostics and the verbal domain of events  
 
3.1. Diagnostics for mass and count 
 
The criteria for mass and count are generally applied to nouns. However, some of them are 
applicable to verbs as well, in particular the choice between mass and count quantifiers and 
the applicability of cardinal and ordinal numerals.
15
  In addition, German offers three mass-
count diagnostics that are applicable to verbs: the choice of relative pronouns, support of 
plural or mass anaphora, and the quantifier beides ‘both’, which is syntactically mass, yet 
lexically dual. 
 
3.2. Choice of mass quantifiers 
 
Verbs generally take mass quantifiers as adverbial quantifiers, such as much, little, a little bit,  
a good deal, a great amount, rather than count quantifiers such as many, few, a few, or a large 
number: 
 
(4) a. John jumped too much / * too many. 
     b. John stumbled only a little / * only a few. 
     c. John slept / worked a little bit / * few. 
     d. John slept / worked too little / * too few. 
     e. Last week, Mary worked out a good deal / a great amount / * a large number. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
whole in a sense, it is never treated as ‘one’ for the purpose of counting. Still, the notion of an integrated whole 
in a situations can be semantically relevant. See Fn 20. 
     Complex NPs have not been classified with respect to a semantic mass-count distinction within the extension-
based approach, only VPs and sentences. 
 
14 Pelletier/Schubert (1989/2013) do take the syntactic mass-count distinction to apply to NPs, rather than just 
nouns. But that is because on their view all nouns can be used as mass or as count nouns and the identification as 
mass or count may depend, for example, on the choice of the determiner. They do not apply extensional 
mereological criteria to the denotation of the NP for identifying them semantically as mass or count parallel to 
what is commonly done to VPs. 
 
15 The criterion of a singular-plural distinction applies, it seems, to verbs in some languages as well. This 
phenomenon of pluractionality is found, for example, in some Native American languages (Hendersen 2019). In 
this paper, I will focus on English, though the question of mass-count diagnostics for verbs in those languages is 
quite relevant and should be explored. 
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Much, little, and a little bit apply as adverbial modifiers whether the verb describes bounded 
events or processes / activities.
16
  
    One might try to explain the impossibility of many and few as adverbial modifiers 
syntactically: many and few are adjectival and moreover generally require a silent noun that 
relates the preceding discourse.  However, first of all, few and many with a silent noun as 
restriction could act adverbially, just as many times does, and a silent noun can, it seems, be 
linked to the verb. A little bit generally also requires an anaphoric restriction (that is how a 
little bit is understood in She knows a little bit), and a little bit can be used adverbially, with 
the Davidsonian event argument position acting as its restriction semantically. There is, 
moreover, the general question why there isn’t an adverbial version of many or few that could 
then apply to verbs. Across languages, it seems, simple adverbial quantifiers are formed from 
nominal mass, not count, quantifiers.  
      For the count quantifiers few, many and a large number to count Davidsonian events, they 
need to modify the noun times: 
 
(5) a. John jumped many times. 
     b. John stumbled a few times 
     c. John slept / worked a few times / too many times. 
     d. John worked out a great number of times this year. 
       
Times has the function of a numeral classifier, by picking out events that have unity in one of 
three ways: [1] by having a boundary (or being atoms with respect to the verbal event 
concept) as in (5a), [2] by being maximally continuous  in time; [3] by occurring at 
contextually given occasions. The latter two options are in principle available for (5b) (the 
second interpretation, for example, when continuing with when I visited).  
 
3.3. Obligatory numeral classifiers with cardinal and ordinal numerals 
 
                                                             
16 There are some restrictions to what verbs much and little can apply. In particular, they are rather bad with 
stative verbs (as opposed to adverbials like strongly or well): 
 
(i) a. ??? Mary believes little / too much that it will rain tomorrow.   
     b.??? John knows French too much. 
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Cardinal numerals do not form adverbials ranging over Davidsonian events. For counting  
events in the verbal domain, they need to combine with the classifier time, and that regardless 
of the Aktionsart of the verb, even with achievements and accomplishments:  
 
(6) a. * John died only one. 
     b. John died only one time. 
(7) a. * John jumped three. 
     b. John jumped three times. 
(8) a. * John ran to the house two. 
     b. John ran to the house two times. 
 
With activity verbs and stative verbs, times individuates events by imposing a condition on 
temporal separation or connecting them to contextually given occasions:
 17
 
 
(9) a. John slept three times today. 
      b. Mary worked out three times this week.  
      c. John was truly happy three times in his life. 
 
As with many and few, one might attempt a syntactic explanation why cardinal numerals 
cannot be used as adverbial modifiers. They are adjectival and generally require an overt noun 
or silent anaphoric noun as restriction. Again, the fact is that cardinal numerals are not used to 
form adverbs that could then modify the verb. 
    This is different for ordinal numerals. First, second, third etc. can act as adverbials, in 
particular in sentence-initial position when ranking the proposition asserted in a list of others 
(Third, John stumbled). However, ordinal numerals cannot act as adverbials ranking the 
described event in a list of events of the same type; for that they need to combine with the 
classifier time(s): 
 
(10) a. ??? Mary stumbled third(ly). 
                                                             
17 Time(s) generally does not apply to stative verbs (H. Filip p.c.):  
 
(i) John knew Bill three times. 
 
But there are exceptions, namely when there are clearly distinct constitutive conditions for separate states: 
 
(ii) John owned the painting three times in his life. 
 
14 
 
        b. Mary stumbled a third time.  
(11) a. ??? John married second(ly). 
       b. John married a second time.  
 
      Time is on a par with numeral classifiers in a language such as Chinese, making a count 
quantifier or numeral applicable to a non-count category. Time(s) in fact exhibits other 
properties characteristic of individuating classifiers, such as not allowing adjectival modifiers 
(Cheng/Sybesma 1999):  
 
(12) a. ??? John stumbled three unusual times. 
        b. ??? We met three beautiful times. 
 
Classifiers like times in English can be found in many other languages, including Italian 
(volta), Spanish (vec), French (fois), German (mal) and Mandarin Chinese ci. More generally, 
it appears that count quantifiers and numerals across languages can apply to Davidsonian 
events only with the use of an event classifier.
 18
 Verbs pattern just like nouns in languages 
such as Chinese, requiring a numeral classifier for a count quantifier or numeral to apply, 
regardless of their lexical content and the nature of the events they describe.
19
  
     Frequency adverbials may seem to pose a challenge to this generalization. Frequency 
adverbials are apparent count quantifiers and can modify verbs without the presence of 
time(s): 
 
(13) a. John stumbled frequently. 
                                                             
18 There are also event classifiers that involve natural units in a structured event, rather than imposing a 
condition on temporal separation. Examples in Mandarin Chinese are ‘turn’-type classifiers, as in (ia, b), which 
contrast with ‘time’-type classifiers, as in (ic) (Huang /Ahrens 2003): 
 
(i) a. (dale) play-ASP san three tang CL taijiquan Tai-Chi yihou after ta s/he shenti body  
         shufu comfortable duo more le LE 
         ‘S/he feels much better after performing three rounds of Tai Chi.’ 
     b. dale play-ASP san three bian CL taijiquan Tai-Chi yihou after ta s/he shenti body  
          shufu comfortable duo more le LE 
         ‘S/he feels much better after performing three rounds of Tai Chi.’ 
     c. dale play-ASP san three ci CL taijiquan Tai-Chi yihou after ta s/he shenti body  
         comfortable duo more le LE  
        ‘S/he feels much better after performing three times Tai Chi.’ 
 
(ia) with tang and (ib) with bian are better than (ic) with the time-based classifier ci.  
 
19 Cinque (2006) argues that temporal measure words such years and days also act as numeral classifiers in 
English. 
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       b. John slept frequently. 
 
However, frequency adverbials do not just count events; rather they count events at particular, 
temporally separated occasions, involving the same individuating condition as the event 
classifier time(s). Frequency adverbials thus incorporate the semantic effect of time(s) as part 
of their lexical meaning. 
      In fact, the adjective frequent, from which frequently is derived, is syntactically not a 
count expression since it can modify event mass nouns as in (14a, b) and not just plural nouns 
as in (14c) (Moltmann 1997): 
 
(14) a. the frequent rain 
       b. the frequent fog in this region 
       c. the frequent rainfalls 
     
Frequent(ly) ensures countability by way of its lexical meaning, which enables it to apply to 
mass categories as well. 
     Frequently is not the only apparent count quantifier able to apply to mass categories. In 
German, vieles ‘many’ is a quantifier that is syntactically mass (being singular and requiring 
singular verb agreement). But it has the meaning of ‘many’, counting well-distinguished units 
and contrasting with viel ‘much’ (Moltmann 1997). The units may be distinguished 
contextually or in virtue of the nature of the substance. For example, vieles in (15a) counts 
either units of wood that are well-distinguished from each other in the context or else different 
types of wood; by contrast viel in (15b) only has a measurement reading: 
 
(15) a. vieles Holz 
            many wood 
           ‘many pieces / sorts of wood’ 
        b. viel Holz 
           ‘much / a lot of wood’ 
 
Vieles thus is a nominal mass quantifier whose lexical meaning conveys conditions of 
discreteness, ensuring countability. Though vieles does not apply as an adverbial to events, it 
illustrates the possibility for a quantifier to impose countability on a domain by way of its 
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lexical meaning, an option that the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction will 
need to admit. 
 
3.4. The German duality-introducing quantifier beides 
 
There is one other quantifier in German that conveys countability lexically and applies to 
Davidsonian events. This is the quantifier beides ‘both’. Beides is syntactically singular, 
requiring singular agreement on the verb.  
 
(16) a. Beides ist / * sind unmoeglich. 
          ‘Both is / are impossible.’ 
 
However, it is not count, since it cannot anaphorically relate to a count NP, say a collective 
NP, as in (16b). It can anaphorically relate only to a mass NP, which needs to stand for two 
distinguished quantities, as in the case of the conjunction in (16c): 
 
(16) b. Hans traf ein Ehepaar. * Beides sind Amerikaner. 
           ‘John met a couple. Both are Americans.’ 
       c. Hans trank den Wasser und das Bier. Er hat beides schnell getrunken. 
           ‘John drank the wine and the beer. He drank both quickly’.  
 
Beides can also act as a floated quantifier with a mass NP that stands for two contextually 
well-individuated subquantities, as below: 
 
(17) a. Das Gold und das Silber kostet beides zu viel. 
          The gold and the silver costs both too much 
       b. Hans kaufte Wasser und Bier. Das war beides sehr billig. 
           John bought water and beer. It was both very cheap 
          ‘John bought water and beer. They were both very cheap.’ 
      c. Der Schmuck in den beiden Schachteln kostet beides 100$. 
          ‘The jewelry in the two boxes is both 100$.’ 
 
17 
 
Beides thus is syntactically mass, yet it conveys countability lexically, similarly to 
frequent(ly) and vieles. That it introduces a plurality of two entities is shown by the fact that 
predicates of counting and listing can apply to it: 
 
(18) Der Wein und der Champagner, Hans hat das beides mitgezaehlt / mitaufgelisted. 
        ‘The wine and the champagne, John has that both counted / listed too.’ 
 
Beides thus involves the meaning of a classifier, mapping an entity of the domain Dn onto a 
plurality of entities in the domain Du. 
    The important observation in the present context is that beides can relate to Davidsonian 
events introduced by a conjunction of VPs, either as a floated quantifier of the mass pronoun 
das, as in (19a, b), or just as anaphorically, as in (19c): 
 
(19) a. Es blitzte und donnerte. Das hat beides nicht lange gedauert. 
            It was lightning and thunder. It has both not long lasted. 
           ‘There was lightning and thunder. They did not last long.’ 
       b. Hans schrieb einen Brief und unterzeichnete ihn. Er hat das beides gestern gemacht. 
          ‘John wrote a letter and signed it. He did it both yesterday.’ 
       c. Maria tanzte und malte. Beides hatte sie gerade gelernt.  
           ‘Mary danced and painted. Both she had just learned.’ 
  
The ability of das beides to relate to Davidsonian events gives further support for the 
classification of verbs as mass rather than count with respect to their event argument place.  
 
3.5. Support of plural anaphora in German 
 
Another diagnostics for the status of verbs as mass rather than count comes from support of 
plural anaphora. Geiss (1975) observed that conjoined VPs do not support plural anaphora in 
a subsequent sentence: 
 
(20) a. John opened the door and closed the window. He did ?? them / ok that an hour ago. 
    
(20) in itself is not indicative of the mass status of verbs, though, since conjunctions of 
definite mass NPs in English do support plural anaphora: 
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(21) a. John drank the water and the wine. He drank them quickly. 
       b. John bought rice and meat. He paid little for them. 
 
However, in German, conjunctions of mass NPs do not support plural anaphora; only plural 
NPs do: 
 
(22) a. Hans trank das Wasser und das Bier. Er trank es (beides) / ?? sie schnell. 
          ‘John drank the wine and the beer. He drank it both / them quickly. 
      b. Hans kaufte Reis und Salad. (Das) beides / ?? Sie brauchte er fuers Mittagessen. 
          ‘John bought fruit and salad. He needed both / them for lunch.’  
 
In German, lack of plural anaphora support thus is a diagnostics for mass.
20
  Note that 
German permits the mass quantifier beides in (22a, b) as well. The German translation of 
(20a) with sie ‘them’ is equally bad, but not with das ‘that’ or das beides: 
 
(20) b.  Hans oeffnete die Tuer und schloss das Fenster. Er tat ?? sie / ok das  / ok das beides  
           vor einer Stunde. 
 
This further supports the classification of verbs as mass with respect to their Davidsonian 
event argument position. 
 
3.6. Selection of relative pronouns in German 
 
There is another mass count diagnostics in German that applies to verbs, and that is the choice 
of relative pronouns. German has two kinds of relative pronouns: w-pronouns (was) and d-
                                                             
20 What seems to matter for plural anaphora in English is that the antecedent stand for a plurality of 
entities presented as having a boundary or more generally being integrated wholes, in the sense of 
Moltmann (1997). One way of being presented as an integrated whole is by being described by a 
singular count noun; another way is by being described as a maximal entity satisfying a property, such 
as being water or being beer in (21a, b).  
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pronouns (der, die, das). The generalization, roughly, is that count full NPs select d-pronouns, 
whereas non-definite mass full NPs select w-pronouns:
21
 
 
(23) a. das Kind, das / * was 
           ‘the child that’ 
        b. alles / etwas Wasser, was / * das im Behaelter war 
           ‘all / some water that was in the container’ 
        c. das Wasser, das / * was im Behaelter war 
           ‘the water that was in the container’ 
 
More precisely, neutral non-definite mass NPs select was, but not masculine or feminine mass 
NPs, which select das: 
 
(24) a. aller Sand / Wein / Unfug, der / * was 
           ‘all (the) sand (masc) / Wine (masc) / nonsense (masc), that’ 
        b. alle Farbe / Fluessigkeit / Schoenheit , die / * was 
           ‘all (the) color  (fem) / liquid (fem) / beauty (fem) that’ 
 
With bare quantifiers and das ‘that’, which are mass, always w-pronouns are chosen: 
 
(24) c. alles / nichts / etwas / das, was / das 
           ‘all / nothing / something that / that’ 
 
This means that, provided the gender category of the head noun is neutral and setting definite 
full NPs aside, the selection of w-pronouns is indicative of mass rather than count. The choice 
of w-pronouns is a sufficient (though not necessary) indication of mass. 
    The important observation then is that verbs always select w-pronouns rather than d-
pronouns, regardless of their Aktionsart: 
 
(25) a. Hans lachte / ruhte, was / * das er selten tut. 
           ‘John laughed / rested, which he does rarely’. 
                                                             
21 The selection of d-pronouns by definite mass NPs may be attributed to the fact that definite mass NPs stand 
for quantities that are integrated wholes, a notion that is distinct from language-driven unity, but does play a 
semantic role. See Fn 14. 
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       b. Maria klopfte an der Tuer, was / * das sie selten tut. 
          ‘John knocked at the door, which he rarely does.’ 
       c. Maria tanzte und sang, was / * das sie beides lange nicht mehr getan hatte. 
          ‘Mary danced and sand, which she both had not done for a long time.’ 
 
Note in (25) the floated mass quantfier beides. 
      The choice of the mass pronoun was over the count pronoun das shows further that verbs 
regardless of their lexical content and semantic environment classify as mass, rather than 
dividing into mass and count. 
 
4. The grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction and the mass diagnostics 
of the verbal domain of events 
 
4.1. Explaining the mass diagnostics of the verbal domain of events 
 
The mass behaviour of verbs presents serious difficulties for the standard, extension-based 
and integrity-based approaches to the semantic mass-count distinction, in addition to the more 
familiar problems that were mentioned. If verbs classify as mass, then this cannot be a 
reflection of mereological properties of the extension of verbs, VPs, or sentences actual or of 
actual, perceived, or situation-relative mereological properties of Davidsonian events.  The 
grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction, by contrast, does permit entities in a 
mass domain to be divided, at the level of cognition, into natural or contextual units. 
Davidsonian events may come in natural units or contextual units, which may still play 
semantic roles, for example, as we have seen, for the semantics of time(s), frequent, vieles and 
beides.  
      This is also the case for nouns in classifier languages such as Chinese, where natural units 
in the denotation of nouns play a semantic role for the choice of sortal classifiers (Cheng / 
Sybesma 1999). Moreover, in the case of object mass nouns, the cognitive individuation of 
entities in their denotation matters for the application of predicates of size and shape (large 
furniture, round hardware) (Moltmann, to appear).  
          The classification of verbs as mass is predicted by the grammar-based approach to the 
mass-count distinction. On that approach, only count categories and classifiers convey the 
relevant sort of unity, but not non-count categories, such as mass nouns and verbs, and that 
regardless of their lexical content or the nature of the entities in their extension. Language-
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driven unity is associated with count categories, but not with the syntactic mass category or 
syntactic categories lacking a syntactic mass-count distinction.
22
  
     The language-driven notion of unity may diverge from notion of unity at the level of 
cognition, where conditions of integrity or concept-relative atomicity are constitutive of unity 
and thus countability. There is often a strong tendency that those conditions match the unity 
conveyed by the grammatical count categories, but language-driven unity as such is not 
derivable from any actual or perceived properties an entity may have (integrity) or from 
mereological properties of the extension of the expression used to refer to it (atomicity). 
    The present version of grammar-based approach to the semantic mass-count distinction 
explains the mass diagnostics of verbs in terms of semantic selection, namely the semantic 
selectional requirement in (3). That is, cardinal and ordinal numerals, count quantifiers, d-
pronouns, plural anaphora, and verbs like count, rank, enumerate, and list semantically select 
entities or pluralities of entities in the domain Du, which includes Davidsonian events. They 
cannot apply to Davidsonian events without the mediation of the classifier time(s) (which 
maps entities Dn onto entities in Du). Mass quantifiers and w-pronouns semantically select 
entities or pluralities of them in Du and thus can apply to Davidsonian events.
23
 Note that this 
does not exclude that mass quantifiers like little and much with verbs like jump may still 
‘measure’ by counting ‘atomic’ events.  
     The classifier times maps a set of Davidsonian events (a subset of Dn) onto a set of events 
or pluralities of events that have unity (a subset of Du), based on natural event units (or 
atoms), external occasions, or maximal temporal continuity. The duality-introducing 
quantifier beides maps an entity in Dn onto a plurality of two entities in Du on the basis of a 
contextual division.
24
 
      
4.2. Event Nominalizations 
                                                             
22 Also Borer’s (2005) theory predicts that verbs do not display a semantic mass-count distinction, which for her 
is tied to the presence or absence of a classifier. Verbs, which do not involve a classifier or plural morphology, 
thus side with mass nouns. 
 
23 See Wellwood/Hacquard/Pancheva (2012) for observations about more to that effect. This in fact is also the 
case for object mass nouns, with which comparative more generally counts individuals rather than measuring in 
terms of volume (Barner / Snedecker 2005). 
 
24 On Rothstein’s (2017) account, they would be considered a matter of semantic type. With respect to their 
event argument, verbs would, in the simplest case, be of type <e, t> (say the verb rain). A mass quantifier can 
apply to a predicate of that type, but not a numeral, which can only apply to a predicate of type <<n, k>, t>. The 
event classifier time(s) maps a verb V of type <e, t> to a complex predicate of type <<n, k>, t>, by ensuring, in 
one way of another, contextual atomicity of events. This enables cardinal and ordinal numerals to apply to 
time(s). 
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Events that are Davidsonian event arguments of verbs need to be distinguished from events 
that are referents of counts nouns, including deverbal nominalizations that are count. Given 
the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction, deverbal count nominalizations do 
more than just pick up an event argument of a verb. By taking part in the morpho-syntactic 
mass-count distinction among nouns, they specify the unity of the events in their extension. 
This happens generally on the basis of the individuation of events in the cognitive ontology 
and thus what the object-based approach takes to be the semantic mass-count distinction 
(Barner / Wagner / Snedeker 2008).  Mass event nominalizations generally are based on 
activity verbs (laughter, rain, sleep), whereas count event nominalizations are based on 
achievement or accomplishment verbs (jump, crossing, death), or else on other natural units 
of events, such as events displaying maximal temporal connectedness (walk, speech, 
workout).  
 
5. Other categories or uses of categories lacking a mass-count distinction 
5.1. Other non-nominal categories and the semantic mass-count distinction 
 
Not only verbs, but also other non-nominal categories display diagnostics of mass rather than 
count. This is expected on the grammar-based approach to the semantic mass-count 
distinction since those categories (at least in English and related languages) do not display a 
morpho-syntactic mass count distinction. 
   The first case to look at is clauses. It is a common (but not universally shared) view that 
clausal complements or subjects act as referential terms standing for propositions. However, 
clauses are not NPs and thus do not display a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction.
25
 As is 
expected on the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction, clauses display 
diagnostics for mass rather than count. (Moltmann 1997). First, clauses in German chose w-
pronouns, not d-pronouns: 
 
(26) Hans glaubt, dass es regnen wird, was / * das Mary auch glaubt. 
       ‘John believes that it will rain, which Mary believes too. 
 
                                                             
25 It has been argued that clauses sometimes are headed by a DP node (Kastner 2015), but this does not mean that 
they engage in a syntactic mass-count distinction. 
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Second, conjoined clauses in German support mass pronouns, but not plural pronouns as 
anaphora, a criterion that this time also applies to English: 
 
(27) Hans glaubt, dass Maria schuldig ist und dass Bill unschuldig ist. Er glaubt das (beides) /  
        ?? sie / ?? die seit langem. 
       ‘John believes that Mary is guilty and that Bill innocent. He has believed that (both) /  
        them for a long time. 
 
Finally, quantifiers in place of clauses are mass, rather than count, as in seen in (28a, b), 
unless they modify the noun thing, as in (28c), which serves as a kind of numeral classifier: 
 
(28) a. John assumes little / too much / a little bit / a great deal. 
        b. ?? John assumes few / too many / a few / a great number. 
        c. John assumes a few things / several things / many things. 
      
   The second case is cardinal numerals. Cardinal numerals are adjectives, but they can also 
occur in argument position, seemingly acting as terms referring to numbers. Numerals used in 
argument position do not come with a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction and thus the 
prediction is that they classify as mass rather than count (despite apparently standing for 
single abstract entities) This is born out, given the mass diagnostics from German of taking w-
pronouns and support og mass pronouns, but not plural pronouns as anaphora (Moltmann 
2013a, 2017):
26
 
 
(29) a. Zwei was / * das eine Primzahl ist, … 
            ‘Two, which is a prime number…’ 
        b. Maria addierte zehn und drei. Hans addierte * sie / ok diese Zahlen auch. 
            ‘Mary added ten and three. John added them / those numbers too.’ 
 
    The observations about clauses and numerals support the general prediction of the 
grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction:  syntactic categories which do not 
display a morpho-syntactic mass-count distinction classify as mass, regardless of the nature of 
their denotations (or semantic functions).  
                                                             
26 Number words in argument position have been considered nonreferential in Hofweber (2005) and Moltmann 
(2013a, b). But see Moltmann (2017) for a recent critique of that view. 
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5.2. Nonreferential uses of NPs and the mass-count distinction 
 
Nominal categories can be used non-referentially, for example as intensional NPs and pure 
quotations. Even though nominal categories as such come with the morphosyntactic mass-
count distinction, when they are used nonreferentially, the semantic content of that distinction 
is inapplicable to their denotations (setting aside the question of what exactly the semantics of 
such nonreferential NPs is). The observations then point to the generalization that non-
referential uses of nominal categories display diagnostics for mass rather than count. 
    First, NP-complements of intensional verbs take w-pronouns and support mass pronouns 
rather than plural pronouns as anaphora in German: 
 
(30) a. Hans braucht eine Assistentin, was / * die / * das Bill auch braucht. 
           ‘John needs an assistant, which Bill needs to.’ 
        b. Hans braucht eine Assistentian und eine Trainerin. Bill braucht das beides / * sie auch. 
           ‘John needs an assistant and a trainer. Bill needs that (both) / them too.’ 
 
Furthermore, they can be replaced only my mass quantifiers: 
 
(31) John needs too much / a great deal / * several / * a great number, an assistant, a  
         secretary, a cook, and a trainer 
 
     Pure quotations are not referential NPs even if they are generally considered referential 
terms standing for expression types (with there being different views of how that may be 
achieved). Pure quotations do not refer in virtue of meaning, which means that, even if they 
consist in nominal categories, the content of the mass-count distinction would not apply to 
their denotations. As expected, pure quotations classify as mass by the criteria pertaining to 
German: 
 
(32) a. ‘Rouge’ bedeutet ‘rot’, was / * das ‘red’ auch bedeutet.  
            ‘Rouge’ means ‘red’, which ‘red’ means too.’ 
        b. ‘Cher’ bedeutet ‘lieb’ und ‘teuer’. ’Dear’ bedeutet das / * sie auch.  
            ‘Cher’ means ‘lieb’ and ‘teuer’. ’Dear’ means that / * them too.’ 
        c. Hans hat ‘cher’ und ‘beau’ uebersetzt. Maria has das beides / diese Worter / * sie /  
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           * die auch uebersetzt. 
            ‘John has translated ‘cher’ and ‘beau’. Mary translated that both / those words / them /  
               them too.’ 
 
That non-referential uses of NPs classify as mass rather than count is of course expected on 
the grammar-based approach to the mass-count distinction. The denotations of such uses of 
NPs do not count as units given the inapplicability of a count category.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The starting point of this paper has been the grammar-based approach to the mass-count 
distinction on which count nouns or numeral classifiers convey unity and thus countability 
and mass nouns the lack of it. The grammar-based approach allows for major discrepancies 
between the ontology of countability conveyed by language and the cognitive ontology in 
which entities are individuated according to conditions of integrity, function, and persistence 
across times and situations. This matches findings in cognitive science: the cognitive division 
of entities into objects and stuff has been shown to precede the acquisition of language and so 
is independent of the mass-count distinction as such (Chierchia 2015). The grammar-based 
approach to the mass-count distinction is able to deal with a range of notorious problems for 
the standard, extension-based or object-based approaches to the content of the mass-count 
distinction.  
     Unlike object-based and extension-based approaches to the content of the mass-count 
distinction, the grammar-based approach predicts that categories without a morpho-syntactic 
mass-count distinction always classify as mass, rather dividing semantically into mass and 
count. The paper has shown that this prediction is borne out for verbs with respect to their 
Davidsonian event argument position, which always classify as mass according to mass-count 
diagnostics applicable to verbs. It also holds for non-nominal categories that can appear in 
argument position as well as for nonreferential uses of NPs. The mass diagnostics of verbs, 
the choice of mass quantifiers and pronouns, the lack plural anaphora support, and the 
inapplicability of number-related predicates, were treated in terms of semantic selection, just 
as in the case of mass nouns on Rothstein’s (2017) account, making use of the absence of a 
language-driven notion of unity. This notion of unity tends to go along with an entity being an 
atom (with respect to a concept) or with having integrity of some sort, but it need not, and 
conversely.  Language imposes its own notion of syntax-based unity, which may or may not 
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go along with unity at the level of cognition or reality. The content of the syntactic mass-
count distinction thus is a matter of ‘grammaticized individuation’ rather of a substantive 
difference in cognitive ontology or the real structure of things.  
     As a subsidiary contribution, the paper has shown that countability may be lexically 
conveyed by particular quantifiers, that is, quantifiers that are nominally mass, yet convey 
unity by way of their lexical meaning. Frequency expressions, which apply to mass nouns as 
well as verbs, are one example. The German quantifiers vieles and beides are other examples.  
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